Can Italy and Spain survive rates of 6-7%?  CEPS Policy Brief No. 279, 27 July 2012 by Gros, Daniel
 
Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS.  
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, 
with the aim of interjecting the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making 
process in a timely fashion. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to 
the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2012 
 
Can Italy and Spain survive rates of 6-7%? 
Daniel Gros 
No. 279, 27 July 2012 
he  sentiment  that  the  euro  is  now  in  real 
danger  is  based  in  large  part  on  the 
widespread conviction that interest rates of 
6-7% are simply unsustainable for both Italy and 
Spain. However, a closer look at the fundamentals 
suggests that both countries should be able to live 
with this level of interest rate for quite some time, 
but only if they mobilize domestic savings, which 
remain  strong  in  both  countries.  For  Spain,  in 
addition, some debt/equity swaps are needed. 
The nature of the fiscal problems differs between 
the two countries. In Italy the main problem is the 
roll-over of the stock of debt, whereas in Spain the 
debt level and the roll-over needs are lower, but 
the deficit is much larger. Moreover, the Spanish 
government faces large contingent liabilities from 
its banking sector. The only way to deal with this 
problem  would  be  to  transfer  most  real  estate 
assets  held  by  the  weak  Spanish  banks  to  a 
European entity with much lower funding costs. 
Italy 
A  strong and  credible  fiscal  adjustment  is  being 
implemented, which should keep the 2012 deficit 
to  between  1%  and  2%  of  GDP,  with  structural 
balance within reach. 
But the government has to refinance each year the 
equivalent  of  about  15-20%  of  GDP  of  old  debt 
falling due; and at present it is paying 6+% on ten-
year  bonds  (less  on  shorter-term  ones).  Many 
observers argue that this is not sustainable.  
However, the Italian government should be able 
to  survive  a  substantial  period  of  high  interest 
rates – as it did in the 1990s when interest rates 
were in the double digits for several years. (See 
my analysis of this period and what is different 
today.)  
The  distribution  of  tasks  should  be  simple:  the 
Italian  households  should  finance  their  own 
government by buying its debt, and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) should prevent a collapse of 
the Italian banking system. 
A  first  element  to  keep  in  mind  is  that  that  the 
higher  interest  cost  affects  only  the  debt  that  is 
maturing  and  needs  to  be  rolled  over.  Higher 
interest  rates  thus  feed  only  very gradually  into 
higher costs for the government. Moreover, while 
the risk premium is very high, one has to take into 
account  that  German  rates  have  gone  down 
considerably.  The  average  cost  (over  all 
maturities) of new debt is still below 6% for the 
Italian  government,  about  2  percentage  points 
higher than before the crisis. Given that roll-overs 
amount  to  about  20%  of  GDP  each  year,  the 
present  constellation  of  higher  rates  increases 
interest costs for the Italian government only by 
about 0.4% of GDP for each year it persists.  
But  the  key  element  of survival  is  that  the  new 
high-cost  debt  should  be  sold  mostly  to  Italian 
residents,  preferably  unleveraged  players  like 
households.  In  this  way  the  higher  cost  of  debt 
service will not be a burden on the country, but 
just a redistribution of income between (domestic) 
savers  and  taxpayers.  (Given  Italy’s  modest  net 
foreign debt (only about 25% of GDP), it is natural 
that  a  high  private-asset/income  ratio  provides 
the counterpart to a high debt/GDP ratio. See the 
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annex for a decomposition of the net foreign asset 
position by sector for Italy.) 
By contrast, to the extent that the new, high-cost 
debt  instruments  are  sold  to  foreign  investors, 
they  constitute  a  burden  on  the  entire  economy 
because they lead to a deterioration in the current 
account.  This  should  be  avoided  by  using 
regulatory and other levers to entice Italian savers 
to  shift  to  Italian  government  debt  –  typically 
BOTs  (short-term  bonds)  and  BTPs  (Italian 
treasury bonds with maturities of 3, 5, 10, 15 and 
30  years).  (On  the  difference  between  domestic 
and foreign debt, see my Policy Brief). At present 
already  less  than  40  %  all  Italian  public  debt  is 
held by foreigners. If the proportion of new debt 
bought by domestic savers could be increased to 
about  80%  over  time,  most  public  debt  would 
migrate  back  to  the  country.  Since  Italian 
households  dispose  of  very  large  foreign  assets, 
they should be able to refinance the roll-over of 
their  government  by  just  selling  their  foreign 
bonds (which now yield close to nothing). In other 
words, this could happen even without any need 
for additional household savings. 
Experience  has  shown  the  importance  of  a 
domestic investor base in times of crisis. During 
the  1990s,  the  interest  burden  for  the  Italian 
government  was  almost  twice  as  high  as  it  is 
today (11% of GDP then, compared to 5.5-6% of 
GDP  today).  But  this  was  sustainable  because 
most  of  the  debt  was  held  by  residents  (the 
famous ‘BOT people’).  
Existing foreign assets should thus be sufficient to 
finance the rollover of Italian government debt for 
quite some time.  
However,  the  country  still  has  an  ‘external 
financing gap’ given that at present Italy still runs 
a  current  account  deficit  of  about  3%  of  GDP, 
somewhat under €50 billion per annum (less next 
year).  If  foreign  investors  refuse  not  only  to 
finance the government, but also Italian private-
sector  borrowers,  the  gap  would  need  to  be 
covered  from  elsewhere.  In  practice  this  means 
that  Italian  banks  would  need  to  obtain  more 
funds from the ECB.  
In  an  ideal  world,  it  is  clearly  not  the  task  of a 
central  bank  to  finance  regional  current  account 
imbalances. But it would still be preferable for the 
ECB  to provide  the Italian  banking system  with 
continuing  access  to  its  normal  monetary  policy 
operations  to  the  tune  of  €50  billion  annually, 
rather  than  see  the  country  being  subject  to  a 
sudden stop. (See my CEPS Commentary on why 
the ECB has no choice but to effectively become 
the  ‘central  counterparty’  for  the  euro  area 
banking system.)  
The  stability  of  the  Italian  banking  system  now 
seems assured given that the ECB has made 3-year 
funding  available  through  the  LTRO  (this  is 
especially  important  given  that  supervisors  will 
not  allow  Italian  banks  to  give  medium-term 
credits to SMEs if they refinance themselves only 
with  short-term  funding).  The  relaxation  of  the 
collateral requirements that came with the LTRO 
is even more important. Banks can now use any 
performing loan to obtain funding. This is crucial 
for a banking system that has conservatively stuck 
to its basic business of lending to the real economy 
and  thus  until  recently  had  more  difficulties 
finding eligible collateral on its balance sheet. 
All in all, it seems that Italy should have a good 
chance to survive even a prolonged period of high 
risk premia if it can mobilize its domestic savings.  
Spain 
The case of Spain is similar in terms of the flows of 
foreign  financing  needs  given  that  the  current 
account is also only about 2-3% of GDP – but very 
different in terms of the stock of foreign debt. The 
flows seem manageable since Spanish households 
still have a solid savings rate. Given the moderate 
current  account  deficit,  Spanish  residents 
(preferably non-leveraged ones) should be able to 
absorb a high proportion of the deficit that needs 
to be financed. 
However,  the  Spanish  private  sector  does  not 
have  enough  (net)  foreign  assets  to  finance  the 
roll-over of the existing stock of public debt. The 
roll-over  needs  are  much  smaller  than  for  Italy 
since Spain’s public debt is (still) smaller and of 
more  recent  vintage,  implying  that  the  direct 
impact  of  higher  interest  rates  on  government 
debt service is not immediately threatening.  
Fundamentally,  however,  the  situation  is  much 
more difficult for Spain since the net foreign debt 
of the country is around 90% of GDP or roughly 
€900  billion,  most  of  which  is  owed  by  the 
government and banks.  
Given  that  Spanish  households  do  not  have 
sizeable net foreign assets, they cannot finance the 
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purchases  by  the  European  Stability  Mechanism 
(ESM) might be required to substitute the foreign 
holders of Spanish public debt who want to exit, 
apparently at almost any price. The high yields on 
bonos (Spanish bonds) also constitute an occasion 
to extract some ‘PSI’ (private sector involvement), 
especially  at  the  longer  end.  Ten  Spanish  bonds 
now  trade  below  70%  of  face  value.  If  the  ESM 
were to buy especially at the longer end, it might 
be able to buy a face value of €300 billion for less 
than  €210  billion.  The  ESM  could  then 
communicate to the markets that in case there are 
problems  it  will  insist  on  seniority  only  for  the 
amount of its own cost (in the example here €210 
billion),  not  the  face  value  of  the  bonds  it  has 
bought  (€300  billion).  In  this  way  the  seniority 
problem could be much reduced. Perhaps private 
investors will even value the potential reduction 
in the debt to be serviced (in case a restructuring 
has  to  take  place)  as  more  important  than  the 
seniority of the ESM. Secondary market purchases 
by the ESM at a steep discount might thus help to 
stabilize  the  market  while  still  respecting  its 
seniority. 
The  real  estate  sector  constitutes  obviously  a 
second  problem  area  in  Spain.  Here  again  the 
main  problem  is  the  need  to  roll  over  foreign 
financing.  For  an  analysis  of  the  Spanish  boom 
and  bust,  see 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/spanish-hangover 
The  dodgy  subordinated  debt  and  preferred 
shares that some legacy institutions from the cajas 
sector  (Spanish  savings  banks,  e.g.  Bankia)  had 
sold to their own customers have attracted a lot of 
attention  and  generated  immense  political 
problems at home. But this is an internal problem, 
involving  Spanish  depositors,  these  particular 
banks  and  the  Spanish  government.  Foreign 
investment  in  the  real  estate  sector  had  been 
mostly on a secured basis, e.g. via cedolas (covered 
bonds, the Spanish version of Pfandbriefe). The vast 
majority  of  Spanish  mortgages  are  still 
performing.1 But this is of little solace to Spanish 
banks, given that these mortgages are usually very 
long term (remaining life of 20 to 30 years) and at 
very low interest rates, usually short-term Euribor 
plus  150  basis  points.  With  Spanish  banks  now 
facing Euribor plus 650 basis points, these ‘good 
assets’  would  actually  constitute  a  considerable 
                                                   
1  The  available  prices  on  Spanish  RMBS  indicate  that 
delinquency rates are expected to remain manageable. 
burden for the banks if they had to refinance them 
as the existing stock of cedolas matures. 
Over the last year, Spanish banks have thus rolled 
over  their  cedolas  almost  exclusively  via  ‘own 
issues’, which they then can refinance at the ECB 
with only a small haircut at such low rates (now 
0.75%)  that  they  still  earn  a  positive  carry.  The 
ECB  can  do  little  to  avoid  financing  this  ‘carry 
trade’, but it might actually be appropriate to do 
so if it had enough detailed information to be able 
to judge both the soundness of the banks and the 
quality of the underlying collateral (part of this is 
already foreseen in the Spanish MoU). Access to 
this  detailed,  usually  confidential,  information 
should be given to the ECB immediately. This will 
happen in any event once the decision of the June 
28th  summit  to  create  a  ‘system  of  supervision’ 
under  the  ECB  has  been  implemented.  But  this 
might take until next year, whereas the ECB needs 
the information right now in order to be able to its 
job properly. 
Moreover, the successors to the cajas have on their 
balance sheets hundreds of billions of euros worth 
of real estate assets of two types: developments in 
various  stages  of  completion  and 
apartments/houses  from  mortgages  in  default. 
How much value there is in these assets is difficult 
to say, but it is clear that they cannot be profitable 
at a financing cost of 6-7% in an environment of 
falling  house  prices  and  stagnating  rents. 
However,  a  European  institution  that  is  able  to 
take a long view and has a low funding cost might 
find  considerable  value  in  these  assets  as  many 
developments might then be finished or used for 
different  purposes.  And  the  rent  income  from 
houses/apartments  should  be sufficient  to  cover 
funding costs if these assets can be transferred at 
an  appropriate  discount  and  refinanced  at  less 
than 3%.  
What  is  needed  is  thus  to  create  as  rapidly  as 
possible – perhaps initially under the auspices of 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) or one of the 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) of the European 
Financial  Stabilisation  Mechanism  (EFSF)  –  a 
European  real  estate  management  vehicle 
(EUREM)  that  could  bid  for  Spanish  (and  also 
Irish) assets taking a long-term view. The key for 
the  success  of  such  an  operation  would  be  to 
assemble enough real estate expertise to properly 
value and then manage these assets. A number of 
private sector real estate management companies 
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the auspices of the EUREM. The financing could 
then be distributed and perhaps securitized with 
the senior tranches sold to the private sector and 
the  junior  tranches  via  the  EIB  (in  turn  issuing 
project bonds) or even EU Structural Funds 
Spanish banks could then sell their directly held 
real estate assets (auctions are also possible, but it 
is unlikely that there would be many bidders in 
the  current  environment)  to  the  EUREM.  This 
would alleviate funding pressures on the Spanish 
banking system and would effectively represent a 
debt  for  equity  swap,  reducing  the  debt  of  the 
country.  It  should  be  possible  to  reach  an 
investment volume of the EUREM in the Spanish 
real  estate  sector  of  about  €200  billion,  thus 
providing  another  substantial  contribution  to 
refinancing the country’s foreign debt. 
Annex: The balance sheet of Italy 
In  a  crisis  the  structure  of  the  balance  sheet 
matters.  That  is  why  it  is  useful  to  look  at  the 
international  investment  position  of  Italy  today. 
Overall,  the  balance  sheet  of  Italy  looks  rather 
healthy, but has two weak spots. 
Healthy …… 
The overall foreign indebtedness of the country is 
limited. The sum of past current account balances 
equals only about €200 billion, or less than 15% of 
GDP. The official statistics of the ‘net international 
investment position’ (NIIP) of the country show a 
somewhat  worse  picture  in  that  Italy  officially 
owes about €400 billion (about 25% of GDP) more 
to foreigners than the country has assets abroad – 
hardly  an  unsustainable  position,  compared  to 
Greece with a net foreign negative asset position 
of over 100% of GDP, or even that of Spain, which 
is  close  to  80%  of  GDP.  This  moderate  foreign 
indebtedness is also reflected in the fact that net 
income  payments  to  foreigners  amount  to  less 
than 1% of GDP.  
….. but vulnerable. 
Unfortunately  it  seems  that  the  country  has 
leveraged itself by issuing debt to pay for equity 
investment abroad. The net debt (defined as the 
balance of assets and liabilities other than equity) 
of the country is thus about €700 billion (45% of 
GDP)  because  Italians  own  about  €300  billion 
more in equity assets abroad than foreigners own 
in Italy (FDI in Italy has been notoriously scarce). 
This makes the country of course more vulnerable 
to a liquidity run. To some extent Italy is thus in a 
similar  position  as  an  investment  bank  which 
might  be  very  well  capitalized,  but  nevertheless 
can  get  into  trouble  when  the  debt  cannot  be 
rolled  over  and  comes  due,  but  the  equity 
investment cannot be liquidated quickly. 
The net foreign position of the main sectors also 
shows vulnerabilities: 
The  foreign  debt  of  the  public  sector  is  close  to 
€800  billion,  and  the  banks  also  have  a  net 
negative position of around €330 billion. It is thus 
not surprising that Italian banks have been hard 
hit when foreign financing dried up. In the short 
run, Italian banks will have little choice but to rely 
increasingly on the ECB. 
By  contrast,  the  non-financial  private  sector 
(households and non-financial enterprises) has a 
strong net positive foreign position of €530 billion 
(30%  of  GDP),  which  is  actually  larger  than  the 
negative position of the banks.  
Figure 1. Net international investment position by 
sector, as of March 2011 (€ billion) 
 
Source: Bank of Italy. 
For the time being, this has not prevented the sell-
off  in  the  Italian  government  bond  market. 
However,  the  fact  that  the  private  sector  has  a 
large  pool  of  foreign  assets  implies  that  the 
pressure on the government bond market could be 
much reduced if Italian savers could somehow be 
persuaded  to  increase  their  investment  in 
(relatively high-yielding) domestic assets. 
This  strong  position  of  the  Italian private  sector 
will  also  become  important  as  the  government 
reduces  its  deficits.  Households  will  be  able  to 
partially  offset  the  higher  taxes  and  lower 
transfers by selling some of their own assets. This 
should limit the negative impact of the inevitable 
austerity measures on demand. 
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